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Abstract
The proliferation of handheld devices such as PDAs and smartphones represents a
new scenario for automatic signature verification. Traditionally, research on signa-
ture verification has been carried out employing signatures acquired using digitizing
tablets or Tablet-PCs. In this work we study the effects of the mobile acquisition
conditions and we analyze the considerations that must be taken in the new handheld
scenario. The analysis is performed with two state-of-the art systems: one feature-
based and another function-based. Two perspectives are taken on the analysis. First,
a comparison of the handheld and the pen tablet scenario from a statistical point
of view based on class separability measures is performed. Second, feature selection
is carried out to investigate the most relevant feature combinations in both systems
and both scenarios. Results confirm that the lack of pen-up trajectory information
on the handheld scenario negatively affects the verification performance, especially
against skilled forgeries. Finally, a system based on fusion of the global and the local
system is presented, with promising results.1
1Part of this work will be published in the Proceedings of the 19th International Conference in Pattern
Recognition, ICPR 2008. The accepted paper is included in Appendix A.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The proliferation of touchscreen-enabled devices represents many new promising scenarios
and applications for signature verification. Automatic signature verification is a challenging task
per se, as it must face a notable variability among signatures from the same individual and the
risk of highly skilled forgers which, due to their unpredictable nature, are not completely possible
to model during the design of a verification system. This work is focused on automatic person
authentication using signature as a biometric trait. Dynamic signature verification for portable
devices is studied and an analysis of its specificities compared to traditional signature verification
systems based on digitizing tablets is performed.
Within biometrics, signature is one of the most socially accepted biometric traits, as it has
been used in financial and legal transactions for centuries (Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia, 2007b;
Plamondon and Lorette, 1989). In the current era of electronic services and ubiquitous access to
information, secure access control and user authentication are common tasks which are usually
performed with tokens or passwords. In this field, biometrics has become a focus of interest as it
uses anatomical (e.g. fingerprint, iris) or behavioral (e.g. voice, signature) traits to authenticate
a user (Jain et al., 2004). These traits cannot be easily stolen or forgotten. It is now common
to observe fingerprint verification systems in portable electronic devices (e.g. handhelds), face
recognition systems for border control purposes and iris verification in some airports (e.g. United
Arab Emirates).
Biometric authentication has gathered an increasing research and commercial interest in
the last few years (Jain et al., 2006) as it represents a convenient and secure means of person
authentication.
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1.1 Biometrics
Biometrics are generally used for identification or verification purposes (Jain et al., 2004). In
the former mode of operation, the biometric trait that individuals present to the system is
used to determine which one of the enrolled users in the database they are, leading to a 1 : N
comparison, where N is the number of users in the database. In the latter, the biometric trait
is used to authenticate an individual claiming to be a specific user, which is performed by a
1 : 1 comparison between the provided biometric trait and the enrolled data of the claimed user.
Throughout this work, we will address the problem of verification, also known as authentication.
Verification systems are essentially two-class classifiers, which produce an accept or reject
decision when a biometric trait along with a user identity are presented to the system. Usu-
ally, verification is based on a decision threshold. If the similarity (or match score) between
the provided trait and the model from the claimed user is higher than a specific threshold, the
user is accepted by the system. On the contrary, the user is rejected. In this context, verifi-
cation systems face two type of errors: False Acceptance (FA) and False Rejection (FR). False
Acceptance is produced when a user that falsely claims to be another user is accepted by the
system as being the genuine user. False Rejection means that a genuine user is rejected by the
system as being an impostor. Given a population of genuine users and impostors and a series
of verification trials, the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) of the
biometric verification system at hand can be computed for any decision threshold.
A common measure to compare the performance of biometric systems is the Equal Error
Rate (EER). It is computed as the system error rate when the decision threshold is set to satisfy
that FAR = FRR. Due to the fact that the output of a verification system is in general a binary
decision (i.e. accept/reject), the performance of a biometric system is usually represented by a
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) or a Detection Error Trade-off (DET) plot (Martin
et al., 1997). These plots allow an easy comparison between different systems at any decision
threshold.
1.1.1 Biometric Modalities
Several biometric modalities have been proposed in the last decades (Jain et al., 2004). These
can be based on physical and behavioral traits depending on their nature. Physical traits are
related to anatomical properties of an individual, and include fingerprint, face, iris and hand
geometry among others. Behavioral traits refer to how an individual performs an action, and
include voice, signature and gait among the most typical. Some examples of popular biometric
traits are presented in Fig. 1.1.
Biometric modalities can be further classified by other measures such as the following:
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Iris Face Voice
Signature Handshape Fingerprint
Figure 1.1: Examples of biometric traits.
• Universality, which states if every person has this biometric.
• Distinctiveness, related to the discriminative power between different individuals of a bio-
metric modality.
• Permanence, which is higher if the traits are invariant along periods of time.
• Collectability, which refers to how easy is to acquire the biometric trait.
• Performance, related to the speed, or accuracy of systems based on a given biometric.
• Acceptability, related to the social perception of the biometric modality.
• Circumvention, which refers to the resilience against attacks to security systems based on
the biometric.
A comparison between some popular biometrics based on the aforementioned measures is
presented in Table 1.1. As can be seen, no specific biometric outperforms the rest of them
on every category. Consequently, the choice of a modality will depend on the application it is
intended to be used for.
1.2 Signature Verification
Signatures have been used since centuries to validate documents and transactions. Therefore,
signature is one of the most socially accepted among all biometric traits. In the last few decades,
3
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Table 1.1: Qualitative comparison of popular biometric modalities. H, M and L denote High, Medium,
and Low respectively. Adapted from (Jain et al., 2004).
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digitizing devices have allowed to perform machine-based signature verification, which has been
an intense research field among the biometric and handwriting recognition research communities.
Despite its wide acceptance, automatic signature verification is still a challenging task. This
can be corroborated by the variety of research works conducted in the last years (Fierrez and
Ortega-Garcia, 2007b; Leclerc and Plamondon, 1994; Plamondon and Lorette, 1989; Plamondon
and Srihari, 2000). One of the main challenges in signature verification is related to the sig-
nature variability. While signatures from the same user show considerable differences between
different captures (high intra-class variability), skilled forgers can perform signatures with high
resemblance to the user’s signature (low inter-class variability). Moreover, when a system is
designed, only a fraction of information about skilled forgeries can be obtained as forgers with
unexpected skills can appear at any time once the system has been deployed.
Two main classes of signature verification systems exist depending on the information ex-
tracted from the signature. Off-line systems use only the signature image, while on-line or
dynamic systems employ digitized time functions of the signature.
Off-line signature verification systems use static signature images, which may have been
scanned or acquired using a camera, to perform verification. The approaches taken for off-line
signature verification have been heterogeneous. Some authors focus on global features using
image or shape-oriented pattern recognition techniques (Sabourin, 1997) while others use local
features, relying on stroke, texture and structural information (Ammar et al., 1990; Guo et al.,
4
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1997). Some approaches combine both global and local features (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2004;
Huang and Yan, 1997).
On-line or dynamic systems use captured signature time-functions. These functions are
obtained using digitizer tablets or touchscreens (e.g. Tablet-PCs, smart phones, etc.). Tradition-
ally, dynamic systems have presented a better performance than off-line systems as more levels
of information than the signature static image are available (Plamondon and Lorette, 1989).
This is the approach considered in this work, and will be described in the following chapters.
1.3 Applications of Signature Verification on Handheld Devices
Touchscreen mobile devices such as smart phones or PDAs provide an appropriate computing
platform for signature verification. In fact, commercial devices already provide handwritten
character recognition as a text input alternative (Anquetil and Bouchereau, 2002; Ballagas
et al., 2006).
Signature verification can be used for a wide range of applications. Among them, we cite
the following:
Payments in commercial environments: the signature is used to validate a payment that
is performed via WiFi, UMTS, GPRS, or other mobile network. This enables ubiquitous
access to commercial transactions. Currently, signatures are not always visually verified
by the cashier, so automatic verification could provide higher security levels.
Legal transactions: legal documents or certificates are signed by the user adding additional
security as the signature is verified. This can be a convenient user validation scheme
for e-government applications. Using on-line signature verification, the protection against
repudiation of signed documents is even increased over traditional signature.
User login: the signature is used to login into a local or remote system as an access control
measure (e.g. bank account, personal records, etc.), instead of traditional methods such
as PINs or passwords.
Customer validation: a customer is validated by its signature. A client that receives a service
or a delivery (e.g. a parcel) signs in a mobile device carried by the deliverer or service
provider to certify his conformity.
Cryptobiometrics: signature is used as a cryptographic key (Freire-Santos et al., 2006) that
identifies the user.
5
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Figure 1.2: Diagram of two possible architectures of a dynamic signature verification platform for
handheld devices (The verification steps have been simplified).
Paperless office: documents are electronically signed without printing them, providing verifi-
cation of the signatures and ubiquitous access to them. This allows business process and
workflow automation where signatures are needed.
In all these applications, the verification system can be either remote or local. Local verifi-
cation systems perform the matching process in the handheld device, while remote systems send
the input signatures over the network and the matching is performed on a remote server. A
model of the two aforementioned architectures is presented in Fig. 1.2. Security must be ensured
in both architectures. While in local systems, the user template and matcher must be secured
in the handheld device, in remote systems, the transmitted signatures and verification system
on the server side must be kept secure.
A key advantage for the deployment of such systems is that touchscreen mobile devices do
not need any extra hardware for signature verification, as it is the case of fingerprint sensors or
cameras for fingerprint and face verification systems respectively. Consequently, no extra costs
exist and the system complexity does not increase.
1.4 Commercial Systems and Applications
Although signature verification systems have a small market share among biometric systems,
there are many commercial systems available. Some examples of signature verification companies
and products are the following:
6
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• CIC provides secure signature verification applications oriented to the financial sector
among other industries. It also provides an SDK (CIC).
• Crypto-Sign offers a PDA user authentication solution (Crypto-Sign).
• KeCrypt is aimed towards user authentication on workflows and payment systems. It
provides both software and hardware (KeCrypt).
• Nemophila provides a signature verification software named Cyber-SIGN, mainly aimed
towards client-server architectures (Nemophila).
• PDALok software is a PDA authentication solution (PdaLok).
• App Informatik Davos offers SignPlus, which is an oﬄine signature verification and man-
agement system, primarily oriented to bank transactions (SignPlus).
• SoftPro solutions are focused on fraud detection and process securing (SOFTPRO).
• Topaz Systems provides software, SDKs and hardware for automatic signature verifica-
tion (Topaz).
• Xyzmo offers signature verification solutions to a wide range of industries (Xyzmo).
1.5 Challenges of Signature Verification on Handheld Devices
Designers of signature verification systems must face many challenges. As has been previously
stated, inter- and intra-variability represent two of the main difficulties when trying to reach a
good verification performance, specially in the case of skilled forgeries.
Handheld devices such as smart phones or PDAs are affected by size and weight constraints
due to their portable nature. While processing units, memory chips and battery components
are nowadays experimenting higher levels of miniaturization and integration, the input (e.g.
keyboard, touchscreen) and output (e.g. display) parts must have reasonable dimensions in
order to keep their usability. Poor ergonomics and small input areas in mobile devices are two
key factors that increase the variability during the signing process. Moreover, the unfamiliar
signing surface may affect the signing process.
The touchscreen digitizing quality must also be taken into account. A typical digitizing
tablet is based on an electromagnetic principle. The tablet has an embedded wire grid which
acts as a transmitter. The pen (which is specifically designed for the tablet) acts as an antenna,
which resonates and emits a signal that is captured by the tablet, allowing to detect its position
with high accuracy. This allows the tablet to detect the pen movement even if it is not in
contact with the tablet (in a reasonable range of proximity). On the other hand, touchscreens
7
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of stylus-oriented handheld devices are based on a resistive principle. Two separated metallic
layers are connected when the screen is pressed with a stylus. The position of the contact point
can be accurately detected, but only when the surface is pressed.
Irregular sampling rates and sampling errors, which are common in mobile devices, may
worsen the verification performance and must be addressed during the preprocessing steps. In
these devices, only position signals are in general available. Pressure, pen-azimuth or other
signals that may improve the verification performance (Muramatsu and Matsumoto, 2007), are
not usually captured by touchscreens from handheld devices. The pen trajectory during pen-ups
is recorded, in general, only in pen tablets. This information, which is invisible to forgers, is not
available for PDAs due to the touchscreen technical limitations.
The interest in security on portable devices has raised in the last few years (Khokhar, 2006).
Security must be a critical concern while designing a signature verification platform as a breach
could give an attacker access to personal data or bank accounts. Gaining access to the matcher
could allow an attacker to perform software attacks such as brute force or hill-climbing at-
tacks (Galbally et al., 2007b). The user template must be appropriately secured (Maiorana
et al., 2008) and encrypted (Freire-Santos et al., 2006) as well as the communication channels
over which signature information may be transmitted.
8
Chapter 2
Related Works and State of the Art
In this chapter, a summary of the research in dynamic signature verification is performed,
presenting related works and available resources.
2.1 Architecture of a Dynamic Signature Verification System
Dynamic signature verification systems generally share a common architecture. The typical
architecture of an automatic signature verification system is depicted in Fig. 2.1. In general,
dynamic signature verification systems perform the following steps (Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia,
2007b):
1. Data Acquisition: Signature signals are captured using a digitizing tablet (WACOM)
or touch-screen device (HYPERCOM) as a PDA or Tablet-PC. Special pens with sensors
that capture forces and movement have also been proposed (Martens and Claesen, 1997).
The signature signal is sampled and stored as discrete time series. While some digitizing
tablets provide pressure or pen angle information, these are not commonly available in
handheld devices. In all cases, the sampling rate is usually equal to or above 100 Hz.
This is a reasonable rate, since it has been observed that the maximum frequencies of the
signature time functions are approximately of 20 - 30 Hz (Plamondon and Lorette, 1989).
After data acquisition, preprocessing steps are commonly performed. These include noise
filtering, resampling, or interpolation of missing samples.
2. Feature Extraction: Two main approaches have been followed in this step: feature-
based systems extract global features (e.g. signature duration, number of pen-ups, average
velocity) from the signature in order to obtain a holistic feature vector (Lee et al., 1996).
On the other hand, function-based systems use the signature time functions (e.g. position,
pressure) for verification. Traditionally, function-based approaches have yielded better
9
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Figure 2.1: Typical architecture of a signature verification system.
results than feature-based ones (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005a; Kholmatov and Yanikoglu,
2005).
3. Enrollment: In model-based systems a statistical user model is computed using a training
set of genuine signatures which is used for future comparisons in the matching step (Nanni
and Lumini, 2005; Richiardi and Drygajlo, 2003). Reference-based systems store the fea-
tures of each signature of the training set as templates. In the matching process the input
signature is compared with each reference signature (Lei and Govindaraju, 2005).
4. Similarity Computation: This step involves pre-alignment if necessary and a match-
ing process, which returns a matching score. In feature-based systems, statistical tech-
niques like Mahalanobis distance, Parzen Windows or Neural Networks are used for match-
ing (Nelson et al., 1994). Function-based systems use other techniques like Hidden Markov
Models - HMM (Dolfing et al., 1998; Fierrez et al., 2007; Van et al., 2007), or Dynamic
Time Warping - DTW (Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2005; Martens and Claesen, 1997; Sato
and Kogure, 1982) to compare signature models.
5. Score Normalization: The matching score may be normalized to a given range. Score
normalization is critical when combining scores from multiple classifiers or in multi-biometric
systems (Ross et al., 2006). More sophisticated techniques like target-dependent score
normalization can lead to an improved system performance (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005b;
Martinez-Diaz et al., 2007b).
An input signature will be considered from the claimed user if its matching score exceeds a
given threshold.
2.2 Feature-based Systems
Feature-based systems, also known as global systems, have been extensively studied (Fierrez-
Aguilar et al., 2005a; Lee et al., 1996; Lei and Govindaraju, 2005; Richiardi et al., 2005). In these
10
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systems, a holistic vector is formed by features extracted from the whole signature, such as dura-
tion, average speed, number of pen-ups, etc. Despite the large amount of different global feature
sets that have been proposed (a maximum of 100 features are considered in (Fierrez-Aguilar
et al., 2005a)), the usually low amount of available training data motivates the usage of feature
selection techniques to reduce the feature vector size (due to the curse of dimensionality). Several
feature selection techniques have been proposed (see Sect. 2.4), being the Sequential Forward
Feature Selection (SFFS) (Pudil et al., 1994) one of the best performing methods reported (Jain
and Zongker, 1997). The matching phase is usually performed with statistical classifiers such as
Gaussian Mixture Models (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2007b), Parzen Windows (Martinez-Diaz et al.,
2007b), majority voting (Lee et al., 1996), Mahalanobis distance (Galbally et al., 2007b), etc.
2.3 Function-based Systems
Function-based systems are also known as local systems. Among these, signature verification
systems using Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) (Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2005; Martens and
Claesen, 1997; Sato and Kogure, 1982) or Hidden Markov Models (HMM) (Dolfing et al., 1998;
Fierrez et al., 2007; Van et al., 2007; Yang et al., 1995) are the most popular approaches in
signature verification. In these systems, the captured time functions (e.g. pen coordinates,
pressure, etc.) are used to model each user signature. Additionally, the use of pen orientation
features such as azimuth or altitude has been reported to provide good results (Muramatsu
and Matsumoto, 2007), although it has been discussed by other authors (Lei and Govindaraju,
2005). Fusion of the feature- and function-based approaches has been reported to provide better
performance than the individual systems (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005a).
2.3.1 Dynamic Time Warping
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) is an application of Dynamic Programming to the problem of
matching time sequences. Yasuhara and Oka (1977) were the first to report its suitability for
dynamic signature verification, by using the algorithm to match time functions extracted from
digitized signature signals. Their approach was an adaptation of the original algorithm proposed
by Sakoe and Chiba (1978) in the field of speech recognition. The goal of DTW is to find an
elastic match among samples of a pair of sequences X and Y that minimize a given distance
measure. The algorithm may be defined as follows (Sakoe and Chiba, 1978). Let’s define two
sequences
X = x1, x2, ..., xi, ..., xI
Y = y1, y2, ..., yj , ..., yJ
(2.1)
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and a distance measure as
d(i, j) = ‖xi − yj‖ (2.2)
between sequence samples. A warping path can be defined as
C = c1, c2, ..., ck, ..., cK (2.3)
where each ck represents a correspondence (i, j) between samples of X and Y . The initial
condition of the algorithm is set to
g1 = g(1, 1) = d(1, 1) · w(1) (2.4)
where gk represents the accumulated distance after k steps and w(k) is a weighting factor that
must be defined. For each iteration, gk is computed as
gk = g(i, j) = min
ck−1
[gk−1 + d(ck) · w(k)] (2.5)
until the I’th and J ’th sample of both sequences respectively is reached. The resulting normal-
ized distance is
D(X,Y ) =
gK∑K
k=1w(k)
(2.6)
where
∑
w(k) compensates the effect of the length of the sequences.
The weighting factors wk are defined in order to restrict which correspondences among
samples of both sequences are allowed. In Fig. 2.2.a, a possible definition of wk is depicted. In
this case, only three transitions are allowed in the computation of gk. Consequently, Eq. (2.5)
becomes
gk = g(i, j) = min

 g(i, j − 1) + d(i, j)g(i − 1, j − 1) + 2d(i, j)
g(i − 1, j) + d(i, j)

 (2.7)
which is one of the most common implementations found in the literature. In Fig. 2.2.b, an
example of point correspondences between two signatures is depicted to visually show how the
results of the elastic alignment.
The algorithm has been further refined for signature verification by many authors (Khol-
matov and Yanikoglu, 2005; Martens and Claesen, 1997; Sato and Kogure, 1982). Moreover,
the implementation by Kholmatov and Yanikoglu (2005) won the Signature Verification Com-
petition 2004 (Yeung et al., 2004). Although the DTW algorithm has been replaced by more
powerful ones such as HMMs or SVMs for speech applications, it remains as a highly effective
12
2.3 Function-based Systems
w k =( ) 1
w k =( ) 1w k =( ) 2
( )i,j( 1 )i= ,j
( 1 1)i= ,j= ( 1)i,j=
(a) (b)
Figure 2.2: (a) Example of symmetrical weighting factors w(k) for Dynamic Time Warping. (b)
Example of point-to-point correspondences between two genuine signatures obtained using DTW.
tool for signature verification as it is best suited for small amounts of training data, which the
common case in signature verification..
2.3.2 Hidden Markov Models
Hidden Markov Models (HMM) have been widely used by the speech recognition community (Ra-
biner, 1989) as well as in many handwriting recognition applications (Dolfing, 1998). Sev-
eral approaches using HMMs for dynamic signature verification have been proposed in the last
years (Dolfing et al., 1998; Fierrez et al., 2007; Muramatsu and Matsumoto, 2003; Van et al.,
2007; Yang et al., 1995). An HMM represents a double stochastic process, governed by an
underlying Markov chain, with a finite number of states and random function set that gen-
erate symbols or observations each of which is associated with one state (Yang et al., 1995).
Observations are modeled with GMMs in most speech and handwriting recognition applica-
tions. GMMs, which can be considered a single-state HMM, have been also successfully used
for signature verification (Richiardi and Drygajlo, 2003).
The basic structure of an HMM using GMMs to model observations is defined by the following
elements:
• Number of hidden states N .
• Number of Gaussian Mixtures per state M .
• Probability transition matrix A = {aij}, which contains the probabilities of jumping from
one state to another or staying on the same state.
13
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Figure 2.3: Graphical representation of a left-to-right N -state HMM, with M -component GMMs repre-
senting observations and no skips between states.
In Fig. 2.3, an example of a possible HMM configuration is shown. Hidden Markov Models
are usually trained in two steps. First, state transition probabilities and observation statistical
models are estimated using a Maximum Likelihood algorithm. After this, a re-estimation step
is carried out using the Baum-Welch algorithm. A detailed description of the training process
is given by Rabiner (1989).
Within HMM-based dynamic signature verification, regional and local approaches have been
proposed. In regional approaches, the extracted time functions are further segmented and con-
verted into a sequence of feature vectors or observations, each one representing regional prop-
erties of the signature signal (Dolfing et al., 1998; Kashi et al., 1997; Yang et al., 1995). Some
examples of segmentation boundaries are null vertical velocity points (Dolfing et al., 1998) or
changes in the quantized trajectory direction (Yang et al., 1995). On the other hand, local
approaches directly use the time functions as observation sequences for the signature model-
ing (Fierrez et al., 2007; Richiardi and Drygajlo, 2003; Van et al., 2007).
Finding a reliable and robust model structure for dynamic signature verification is not a
trivial task. While too simple HMMs may not allow to model properly the user signatures,
too complex models may not be able to model future realizations due to overfitting. On the
other hand, as simple models have less parameters to be estimated, their estimation may be more
robust than for complex models. Two main parameters are commonly considered while selecting
an optimal model structure: the number of states and the number of Gaussian mixtures per
state (Fierrez et al., 2007). Most of the proposed systems consider a left-ro-right configuration
without skips between states, also known as Bakis topology (see Fig. 2.3).
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2.4 Feature Selection
Due to the curse of dimensionality (Theodoridis and Koutroumbas, 2006), the performance of a
statistical classifier is degraded if the available training data is too small compared to the number
of dimensions of the feature vector (Jain and Zongker, 1997). This is usually the case in signature
verification, where the average length of a digitized signature is of a few hundreds of samples and
the available number of training signatures is relatively small (in practical applications between
3 and 5). The amount of training signatures is mostly conditioned by the willingness of the
users to provide many samples during enrollment. Nevertheless, when signatures are captured
during only one unique session, their variability is small in general, leading to a poorly trained
model.
Feature selection techniques try to reduce the dimensionality of the feature vectors while
optimizing the verification accuracy. Their goal is to find the optimum combination of features
according to a given optimization criterion. Ideally, given a feature vector of F dimensions, all
the possible combinations from 1 to F features should be tested in order to find the optimal
combination. Unfortunately, this is not feasible due to the high amount of combinations that
have to be tested, which is
F∑
i=1
(
F
i
)
.
A critical step when performing feature selection is the choice of the optimization criterion.
Two main alternatives can be taken: filter and wrapper methods (Theodoridis and Koutroumbas,
2006). In the former, the optimal feature subset is selected according to intrinsic properties of
the training data such as statistical properties. In the latter, the result of the classification
problem under consideration is used as the criterion to be optimized. A reasonable choice for
a signature verification system is a wrapper method in which the verification performance in
terms of the EER is set as the optimization criterion. Wrapper methods require in general more
computational resources, as the evaluation of the optimization criterion (e.g. the verification
decision) is commonly more complex than the computation of statistical properties of the training
data.
Feature selection has been applied to signature verification from several perspectives. Lee
et al. (1996) propose a method for global features which ranks the discriminative power of each
feature for each specific user, based on the distance between the user signatures and the rest of
users. They select as an optimal feature vector the one that contains the features that are most
commonly ranked among the most discriminative over all the users in the database. Fierrez-
Aguilar et al. (2005a) perform feature ranking based on their Mahalanobis distance between
signatures from different users. The optimal feature vector is then selected by iteratively adding
individual features in the order they were ranked and selecting the best performing vector in
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terms of the system EER. Richiardi et al. (2005) propose a distance measure based on the Fisher
Discriminant Ratio and use it to perform Sequential Forward Floating Search Selection (SFFS),
which is summarized in this section. Galbally et al. (2007a) perform feature selection by using
Genetic Algorithms and setting the system EER as the optimization criterion.
2.4.1 Feature Selection Algorithms
Several feature selection techniques have been proposed in the literature aimed towards reducing
the number of feature combinations that have to be tested. Unfortunately, all of them are only
able to find suboptimal solutions. A notable exception is the Branch and Bound algorithm,
which is however only applicable when the optimization criterion increases monotonically with
the feature subset size. While some of the algorithms are deterministic and always lead to the
same suboptimal solution, other algorithms may produce different suboptimal solutions in each
execution (Jain and Zongker, 1997). The most popular techniques are summarized next.
2.4.1.1 Scalar Feature Selection
Features are considered individually using this procedure. Each feature is ranked in terms of its
class separability using a predefined criterion C, such as the system EER or any distance mea-
sure. Then, the N top ranked features in terms of C are selected as the optimal N -dimensional
feature vector. This method has the advantage of being computationally simple. Nevertheless,
it does not take into account the possible correlations among features. Some techniques to deal
with this problem have been proposed in the literature (Theodoridis and Koutroumbas, 2006).
This approach is taken in (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005a).
2.4.1.2 Sequential Forward/Backward Selection
In Sequential Forward Selection, given F available features we start by selecting the most dis-
criminative feature xi. Then, all the possible combinations between this feature and any other
feature xf are computed and the best combination {xi, xj} is selected. The algorithm continues
by iteratively adding features in this manner until the desired feature vector size is reached. The
Sequential Backward Selection is similar to this approach but instead of starting with a single
feature it starts with all the F features and one feature is removed at a time.
2.4.1.3 Floating Search
Pudil et al. (1994) proposed a feature selection algorithm that overcomes some of the limitations
of the ones presented above. Namely, when a feature is selected by the previous methods (or
discarded, in the backward case), it can no longer be discarded (or selected, in the backward
case). This is known as the nesting effect. As with Sequential Selection, both a forward and
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a backward approach exist. We focus on the forward method, referred to as Sequential For-
ward Floating Search (SFFS). The algorithm can be summarized as follows (Theodoridis and
Koutroumbas, 2006).
Let’s consider a set of F features, from which we wish to find the best performing subset
of N features, N ≤ F in terms of a given criterion C. Let Xn = {x1, x2, ..., xn} be the best
combination of n features and YF−n the set of remaining F − n features. In the algorithm, we
store the best sets of lower dimensions X1,X2, ...,Xn−1. The following steps are performed until
a loop with a stable set Xn is obtained.
1. Inclusion
Choose the element xn+1 from YF−n which, added to Xn produces the best value of the
optimization criterion C. Then, Xn+1 = {Xn, xn+1}.
2. Test
(a) Find the feature xr that has the least negative (or most positive) effect on the criterion
C when it is removed from Xn+1.
(b) If r = n+ 1, change n for n+ 1 and go to step 1.
(c) If r 6= n + 1 and C(Xn+1 − {xr}) < C(Xn) go to step 1, that is, if removal of any
feature does not improve the criterion on the previously selected set Xn, no further
backward search is performed.
3. Exclusion
(a) Remove xr to get X
′
n = Xn+1 − {xr}.
(b) Find the feature xs that has the least negative effect on the criterion C when it is
removed from X ′n.
(c) If C(X ′n − {xs}) < C(Xn−1) then Xn = X ′n and go to step 1, that is, if removal of
another feature does not improve the criterion on the previously selected set Xn, no
further backward search is performed.
(d) Remove xs by putting X
′
n−1 = X
′
n − {xs} and n = n− 1.
(e) Go to step 3.a.
Note that some specific conditions on the first steps have not been considered in order to
simplify the algorithm description. The backward algorithm is equivalent to the one explained
but removing instead of adding features.
Other algorithms for feature selection include Neural Networks and Genetic Algorithms (Gal-
bally et al., 2007a), although the latter produce variable suboptimal results among different
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executions. Jain and Zongker (1997) performed an exhaustive comparison of several feature se-
lection algorithms and studied the impact of small training sets on them. The SFFS proved to
be highly effective, obtaining results close to the optimal set selected by the Branch and Bound
algorithm.
2.5 Dynamic Signature Databases
Publicly available databases allow researchers to perform an objective comparison of their veri-
fication algorithms. Until the last few years, much research had been carried out using private
databases, as no large public ones were available. This does not allow reliable performance com-
parisons of different algorithms, which may have been tuned to a specific database. Moreover,
the usage of small datasets reduces the statistical relevance of experiments. Privacy and legal
issues have also played a relevant role in the lack of public signature datasets.
The variation of signatures among different cultures must also be taken into account. As an
example, in Europe signatures are usually formed by a fast writing followed by a flourish while
in North America they usually correspond to the signers name with no flourish. On the other
hand, signatures in Asia are commonly formed by asian characters, which are composed of a
larger number of short strokes compared to European or North American signatures.
While some authors have made public the databases used for their research (Munich and
Perona, 2003), most current dynamic signature databases are collected by the joint effort of
different research institutions. In the following, a brief description of the most relevant available
databases, in chronological order, is given.
PHILIPS Database. Signatures from 51 users were captured using a digitizing tablet at
a sampling rate of 200 Hz (Dolfing et al., 1998). The following signals were captured: pen-
coordinates, pen-pressure, and the pen-tilt, which is composed by the two angles resulting from
the projection of the pen in the (x, z) and (y, z) planes.
Each user contributed 30 genuine signatures, leading to 1530 genuine signatures. Three types
of forgeries are present in the database: 1470 over-the-shoulder forgeries, 1530 home-improved
and 240 professional forgeries. Over-the-shoulder forgeries were produced by letting the forger
observe the signing process. Home-improved forgeries were produced by giving to the forgers the
signature static image and letting them to practice at home (see Fig. 2.4). Finally, professional
forgeries were performed by forensic document examiners.
MCYT Signature Subcorpus. The MCYT bimodal database is comprised of signatures
and fingerprints from 330 individuals (Ortega-Garcia et al., 2003). Signatures were acquired
using a WACOM Intuos A6 tablet with a sampling frequency of 100 Hz. The capture area
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(b)(a) (c)
Figure 2.4: Examples of signatures for a particular subject of the PHILIPS Database. (a) Genuine
signatures, (b) over-the-shoulder forgeries, and (c) home improved forgeries. Adapted from (Dolfing
et al., 1998).
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Figure 2.5: MCYT example signatures and associated functions for two different subjects. One genuine
signature (left) and two forgeries (right columns) are presented for each user. Adapted from (Fierrez
et al., 2007).
was divided in frames for acquisition of 37.5 mm (width) × 17.5 mm (height). The following
time sequences are captured: position coordinates, pressure, azimuth angle and altitude angle.
Example signatures and their associated functions are shown in Fig. 2.5.
There are 25 genuine signatures and 25 forgeries per user. Signatures were captured in
groups of 5. First, 5 genuine signatures, then 5 skilled forgeries from another user, repeating
this until 25 signatures from each type were performed. Each user provided 5 forgeries for the 5
previous users in the database. As the user is forced to concentrate on different tasks between
each group of genuine signatures, the variability between groups is expected to be higher than
the one within the same group.
BIOMET Signature Subcorpus. This signature subcorpus is part of the BIOMET multi-
modal database (Garcia-Salicetti et al., 2003). The signatures were captured using a WACOM
Intuos2 A6 Pen-tablet and an ink pen with a sampling rate of 100 Hz. The pen coordinates,
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Figure 2.6: SVC 2004 example signatures and associated functions extracted by the pen tablet. For a
particular subject, two genuine signatures (left columns) and two forgeries (right columns) are presented.
Adapted from (Fierrez et al., 2007).
pen-pressure, azimuth and altitude signals were captured. The database contains data from 84
users, with 15 genuine signatures and 12 forgeries per user. Signatures were captured in two
sessions separated by 5 months. In the first session, 5 genuine signatures and 6 forgeries were
acquired. The remaining 10 genuine signatures and 6 forgeries were captured in the second
session. Forgeries are performed by 4 different users (3 forgeries each). This database contains
2201 signatures, since not all users have complete data: 8 genuine signatures and 54 forgeries
are missing.
SVC 2004 Database. Two development databases were released prior to the Signature Ver-
ification Competition (SVC) 2004 (Yeung et al., 2004). They were captured using a WACOM
digitizing tablet and a Grip Pen. Due to privacy issues, users were advised to use invented
signatures as genuine ones. The two databases differ in the available data, and correspond to
the two tasks defined in the competition. One contains only coordinate information while the
other provides also pressure and pen orientation signals. Each database contains 40 users, with
20 genuine signatures and 20 forgeries per user acquired in two sessions. Both occidental and
asian signatures are present in the databases. Examples of signatures from this database are
shown in Fig. 2.6.
BioSecure Signature Subcorpus DS2 - Access Control Scenario. This database was
captured under the BioSecure Network of Excellence (Biosecure Network of Excellence, 2007)
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.7: (a) PDA signature capture process in the BIOSECURE DS3 - Mobile Scenario dataset. (b)
Pen-tablet capture process in the BIOSECURE DS2 - Access Control Scenario dataset.
and is not yet available. It is part of the BioSecure multimodal database (Data Set 2) and consists
of 667 users, although the completeness of the data for each user is still not confirmed. It was
acquired at seven different sites in Europe. Acquisition was carried out using a WACOM Intuos3
A6 digitizer at 100 Hz following a procedure similar to the one conducted in MCYT (Ortega-
Garcia et al., 2003). The pen coordinates, pressure, azimuth and altitude signals are available.
Signatures were captured in two sessions and in blocks of 5. During each session, users were
asked to perform 3 sets of 5 genuine signatures, and 5 forgeries between each set. Each user
performed 5 forgeries for the previous 4 users in the database. The users had visual access to the
dynamics of the signing process of the signatures they had to forge. Thus, 30 genuine signatures
and 20 forgeries are available for each user. An example of the signature capture process of this
database including the paper template that was used is depicted in Fig. 2.7.(b).
BioSecure Signature Subcorpus DS3 - Mobile Scenario. The BioSecure Signature Sub-
corpus DS3 was acquired under the same framework than the Access Control Scenario but on
a mobile scenario (GET-INT, 2007). It was acquired in 8 different sites in Europe and is not
yet available (Alonso-Fernandez et al., 2008). It is the first multi-session database captured on
a PDA. An HP iPAQ hx2790 with a sampling frequency of 100 Hz was used as capture device.
Only the pen coordinates and time stamps are available. Users were asked to sign while standing
and holding the PDA in one hand. This was done to emulate realistic operating conditions. The
acquisition protocol was the same than for the Access Control Scenario Signature Subcorpus,
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Figure 2.8: Examples of signatures and associated signals from the BioSecure Multimodal Database DS2
and DS3 signature subcorpora captured using a pen tablet (top) and a PDA (bottom), respectively.
in which signature data was captured using a pen tablet. An average of two months was left
between each session. Forgeries for each user are performed by 4 different users (5 forgeries
each) in a “worst case” scenario, where each forger has access to the dynamics of the genuine
signature in the PDA screen and a tracker tool allowing to see the original strokes. An example
of the capture process of this database can be seen in Fig. 2.7.(a). Examples of signatures from
the BioSecure Signature subcorpora DS2 and DS3 are presented in Fig. 2.8. Signatures cap-
tured with the PDA present missing samples (i.e. sampling errors) due to the PDA touchscreen
acquisition process.
Other databases found in the literature include the SUSIG Database (Kholmatov and Yanikoglu,
2008) and the MyIDea signature subcorpus (Dumas et al., 2005).
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Chapter 3
Signature Verification Systems
In the present chapter, the automatic signature verification systems used in this work are
described. A function-based system (referred to as local) and a feature-based system (referred
to as global) are considered. The local verification system is based on the one presented by
Fierrez and Ortega-Garcia (2007a), to which some features extracted from related works have
been added. The global system is based on the one presented in (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005a).
3.1 Global Signature Verification System
This feature-based signature verification system considers a set of 100 global features, extracted
from each signature. The feature set is an extension of other sets presented in previous works
in the literature (Lee et al., 1996; Nelson and Kishon, 1991; Nelson et al., 1994). A complete
description of the feature set is shown in Table 3.1. These 100 features can be divided in four
categories corresponding to the following magnitudes (the numbering is the same used in Fierrez-
Aguilar et al. (2005a)):
• Time (25 features), related to signature duration, or timing of events such as pen-ups or
local maxima: 1, 13, 22, 32, 38, 40-42, 50, 52, 58-60, 62, 64, 68, 79, 81-82, 87-90, 94, 100.
• Speed and Acceleration (25 features), from the first and second order time derivatives
of the position time functions, like average speed or maximum speed: 4-6, 9-11, 14, 23, 26,
29, 31, 33, 39, 44-45, 48, 69, 74, 76, 80, 83, 85, 91-92, 96.
• Direction (18 features), extracted from the path trajectory like the starting direction or
mean direction between pen-ups: 34, 51, 56-57, 61, 63, 66, 71-73, 77-78, 84, 93, 95, 97-99.
• Geometry (32 features), associated to the strokes or signature aspect-ratio: 2, 3, 7-8, 12,
15-21, 24-25, 27-28, 30, 35-37, 43, 46-47, 49, 53-55, 65, 67, 70, 75, 86.
Features are normalized into the range (0, 1) using tanh-estimators (Jain et al., 2005). The
Mahalanobis distance is used to compare a signature with a claimed user model. This distance
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Table 3.1: Set of global features. Table adapted from (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005a). T denotes time
interval, t denotes time instant, N denotes number of events, and θ denotes angle. Note that some
symbols are defined in different features of the table (e.g. ∆ in feature 7 is defined in feature 15)
# Time related feature # Direction related feature
# Speed and Acceleration related feature # Geometry related feature
Ranking Feature Description Ranking Feature Description
1 signature total duration Ts 2 N(pen-ups)
3 N(sign changes of dx/dt and dy/dt) 4 average jerk ¯
5 standard deviation of ay 6 standard deviation of vy
7 (standard deviation of y)/∆y 8 N(local maxima in x)
9 standard deviation of ax 10 standard deviation of vx
11 jrms 12 N(local maxima in y)
13 t(2nd pen-down)/Ts 14 (average velocity v¯)/vx,max
15 Amin=(ymax−ymin)(xmax−xmin)
(∆x=
∑pen-downs
i=1
(xmax |i−xmin |i))∆y
16 (xlast pen-up − xmax)/∆x
17 (x1st pen-down − xmin)/∆x 18 (ylast pen-up − ymin)/∆y
19 (y1st pen-down − ymin)/∆y 20 (Tw v¯)/(ymax − ymin)
21 (Tw v¯)/(xmax − xmin) 22 (pen-down duration Tw)/Ts
23 v¯/vy,max 24 (ylast pen-up − ymax)/∆y
25
T ((dy/dt)/(dx/dt)>0)
T ((dy/dt)/(dx/dt)<0)
26 v¯/vmax
27 (y1st pen-down − ymax)/∆y 28 (xlast pen-up − xmin)/∆x
29 (velocity rms v)/vmax 30
(xmax−xmin)∆y
(ymax−ymin)∆x
31 (velocity correlation vx,y)/v2max 32 T (vy > 0|pen-up)/Tw
33 N(vx = 0) 34 direction histogram s1
35 (y2nd local max − y1st pen-down)/∆y 36 (xmax − xmin)/xacquisition range
37 (x1st pen-down − xmax)/∆x 38 T (curvature > Thresholdcurv)/Tw
39 (integrated abs. centr. acc. aIc)/amax 40 T (vx > 0)/Tw
41 T (vx < 0|pen-up)/Tw 42 T (vx > 0|pen-up)/Tw
43 (x3rd local max − x1st pen-down)/∆x 44 N(vy = 0)
45 (acceleration rms a)/amax 46 (standard deviation of x)/∆x
47
T ((dx/dt)(dy/dt)>0)
T ((dx/dt)(dy/dt)<0)
48 (tangential acceleration rms at)/amax
49 (x2nd local max − x1st pen-down)/∆x 50 T (vy < 0|pen-up)/Tw
51 direction histogram s2 52 t(3rd pen-down)/Ts
53 (max distance between points)/Amin 54 (y3rd local max − y1st pen-down)/∆y
55 (x¯− xmin)/x¯ 56 direction histogram s5
57 direction histogram s3 58 T (vx < 0)/Tw
59 T (vy > 0)/Tw 60 T (vy < 0)/Tw
61 direction histogram s8 62 (1st t(vx,min))/Tw
63 direction histogram s6 64 T (1st pen-up)/Tw
65 spatial histogram t4 66 direction histogram s4
67 (ymax − ymin)/yacquisition range 68 (1st t(vx,max))/Tw
69 (centripetal acceleration rms ac)/amax 70 spatial histogram t1
71 θ(1st to 2nd pen-down) 72 θ(1st pen-down to 2nd pen-up)
73 direction histogram s7 74 t(jx,max)/Tw
75 spatial histogram t2 76 jx,max
77 θ(1st pen-down to last pen-up) 78 θ(1st pen-down to 1st pen-up)
79 (1st t(xmax))/Tw 80 ¯x
81 T (2nd pen-up)/Tw 82 (1st t(vmax))/Tw
83 jy,max 84 θ(2nd pen-down to 2nd pen-up)
85 jmax 86 spatial histogram t3
87 (1st t(vy,min))/Tw 88 (2nd t(xmax))/Tw
89 (3rd t(xmax))/Tw 90 (1st t(vy,max))/Tw
91 t(jmax)/Tw 92 t(jy,max)/Tw
93 direction change histogram c2 94 (3rd t(ymax))/Tw
95 direction change histogram c4 96 ¯y
97 direction change histogram c3 98 θ(initial direction)
99 θ(before last pen-up) 100 (2nd t(ymax))/Tw
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measure has the advantage of being relatively simple to compute and generic enough to provide
a reasonable empirical estimate of the statistical class separability achieved by the features. In
this manner, user models C = (µ,Σ) are created from a training set of signatures, where Σ is
a diagonal covariance matrix. Thus, a classifier is built where the matching score is obtained as
the inverse of the Mahalanobis distance between the input signature feature vector x and the
claimed user model C:
s(x, C) =
(
(x− µ)T (Σ)−1 (x− µ)
)−1/2
.
If the score s(x, C) is above a specific threshold, the signature is considered as genuine. On
the contrary it is rejected by the system.
3.2 Local Signature Verification System
The system implemented in this work is based on the one described by Fierrez et al. (2007).
It participated in the Signature Verification Competition 2004 (Yeung et al., 2004), where it
reached the first and second positions against random and skilled forgeries respectively.
The signals captured by the digitizer are used to extract a set of functions that model each
signature. The original set of functions from (Fierrez et al., 2007) has been extended in this
work, adapting features from other contributions (Lei and Govindaraju, 2005; Richiardi et al.,
2005; Van et al., 2007). In the original set, 7 functions were extracted from the raw signals, from
which the first and second order derivatives were computed, leading to a 21-dimensional feature
vector. The second order derivatives are discarded in this work as they proved to have a very
low contribution in the verification performance (as corroborated in Richiardi et al. (2005)). In
the present work, an extended set of 15 functions is proposed, plus 12 functions obtained from
the first and second order derivatives of some of them. In Table 3.2 we present the resulting set
of 27 functions. Examples of the extracted functions can be seen in Fig. 3.1.
As it will be further addressed, the original system assumes the availability of pressure and
pen-inclination information, although this is not usually the case for signatures captured with
a handheld device. In those cases, only 21 features can be extracted from the raw signals.
In our implementation, an initial step is added to the original HMM training scheme (Fierrez
et al., 2007), leading to the following stages: i) the global mean and covariance of the training
signatures is assigned to all the mixtures, ii) k-means segmentation and Maximum Likelihood
training is performed, iii) Baum-Welch re-estimation is carried out. The first step allows to
have a trainable model for step iii (despite being inaccurate) in the case where step ii fails due
to the large number of parameters to be estimated, or other computational problems.
Similarity scores are computed as the log-likelihood of the signature (using the Viterbi al-
gorithm) divided by the total number of samples of the signature. No score alignment between
users is applied (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005b). In order to keep scores between a reasonable
range, normalized scores sn between (0,1) are obtained as sn = exp (s(x, C)/30), where x and
C represent respectively the input signature to verify and the enrolled model of the claimed
identity.
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Table 3.2: Extended set of local features. The upper dot notation (e.g. x˙n) indicates time derivative.
Features 3, 10, 15, 16, 17 and 18 are not available in the PDA scenario.
# Feature Description
1 x-coordinate xn
2 y-coordinate yn
3 Pen-pressure zn
4 Path-tangent angle θn = arctan(y˙n/x˙n)
5 Path velocity magnitude υn =
√
y˙n + x˙n
6 Log curvature radius ρn = log(1/κn) = log(υn/θ˙n), where κn is the
curvature of the position trajectory
7 Total acceleration magnitude an =
√
t2n + c
2
n =
√
υ˙2n + υ
2
nθ
2
n , where tn
and cn are respectively the tangential and cen-
tripetal acceleration components of the pen
motion.
8-14 First-order derivative of features 1-7 x˙n, y˙n, z˙n, θ˙n, υ˙n, ρ˙n, a˙n
15 Pen azimuth γn
16 Pen altitude φn
17-18 First-order derivative of features
15-16
γ˙n, φ˙n
19-20 Second-order derivative of features 1-2 x¨n, y¨n
21 Ratio of the minimum over the maxi-
mum speed over a window of 5 samples
υrn = min {υn−4, ..., υn}/max {υn−4, ..., υn}
22-23 Angle of consecutive samples and first
order difference
αn = arctan(yn − yn−1/xn − xn−1)
α˙n
24 Sine sn = sin(αn)
25 Cosine cn = cos(αn)
26 Stroke length to width ratio over a win-
dow of 5 samples
r5n =
k=n∑
k=n−4
√
(xk−xk−1)2+(yk−yk−1)2
max{xn−4,...,xn}−min{xn−4,...,xn}
27 Stroke length to width ratio over a win-
dow of 7 samples
r7n =
k=n∑
k=n−6
√
(xk−xk−1)2+(yk−yk−1)2
max{xn−6,...,xn}−min{xn−6,...,xn}
26
3.2 Local Signature Verification System
SkilledforgeryGenuine Signature
Figure 3.1: Examples of functions from the 27-feature extended set defined in Table 3.2 for a genuine
signature (left) and a skilled forgery (right) of a particular subject from the BIOSECURE DS2 Database.
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Chapter 4
Experiments
The experimental framework and results of this thesis are covered in this chapter. We have
defined a protocol in which the particularities of signature verification for handheld devices and
the pen tablet scenario are studied from a statistical and an applied point of view. Experi-
ments are carried out using signatures from the same set of users acquired in the two scenarios
considered, allowing to perform a fair comparison between them.
4.1 Database
A subset of the PDA and pen tablet signature corpus of the BioSecure Multimodal Biometric
Database (Alonso-Fernandez et al., 2008) is used for experiments. It consists of 120 users, with
20 genuine signatures and 20 skilled forgeries per user and acquisition device (PDA and pen
tablet). The genuine signatures were acquired in two different sessions separated by an average
period of two months, being 5 signatures from the first session and the remaining 15 from the
second session. In each session, signatures were performed in blocks of 5, leaving a gap of some
minutes between each block. Signatures were captured with an HP iPAQ 2790 PDA while the
user was standing and holding the PDA with one hand; whereas for the pen tablet case they
were captured with a Wacom Intuos A6 tablet while the user was sitting, using a pen on a paper
placed over the tablet (see Fig. 2.7). This emulates real operating conditions.
Only the x and y position signals and the sample timestamps are captured by the PDA,
while pressure information and pen orientation (azimuth and altitude angles) is also provided
by the pen tablet. Skilled forgeries for each user were performed by 4 different users (5 forgeries
each) in a “worst case” scenario: each forger had visual access to the dynamics of the genuine
signature and a tracker tool allowing to see the original strokes in both scenarios. In the PDA
scenario, the original strokes were shown in the PDA screen, where some users were even allowed
to sign while seeing them. For the pen tablet scenario, the strokes were presented in a computer
screen.
An example of the captured signatures, their associated signals and the distribution of two
features on both scenarios is shown in Fig. 4.1. It can be seen that signatures captured with
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Figure 4.1: Left: signatures from a user of the database on both scenarios and their corresponding
signals used for the experiments. Azimuth and altitude signals are also available for pen tablet. No
pressure signals are available for the signatures captured with PDA. Right: distribution of two example
features for a particular user.
the PDA have missing samples due to capture errors. A preprocessing step is performed in the
PDA signature subcorpus to interpolate missing samples due to sampling errors. Interpolation is
performed using splines (Martinez-Diaz et al., 2007a), since in preliminary experimental results
this leads to a better verification performance than linear interpolation. Moreover, as no pen-up
information is recorded by the PDA, pen-ups are heuristically assigned wherever a gap of 50 or
more milliseconds between samples exist. The samples between the pen-up and pen-down are
also interpolated. A preprocessing step consisting on position normalization is performed, by
aligning the center of mass of each signature to a common coordinate.
From each subset (PDA and pen tablet), the signatures of 50 users are used for development
purposes, while the remaining 70 is left as a validation set to compute the verification perfor-
mance. More specifically, the subset of the first 50 users is used to find the best performing
features (via SFFS feature selection) and to find the optimal system parameters. The remain-
ing 70 users are left to validate the results. This setup follows the protocol of the BioSecure
Multimodal Evaluation Campaign (BMEC), where a subset of 50 users was previously released
for algorithm tuning before submission to the competition (GET-INT, 2007). The evaluation
was later performed by the organizers on sequestered test data corresponding to a larger set of
subjects.
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4.2 Experimental Protocol
User models are trained with the 5 genuine signatures from the first session, while the remaining
15 genuine signatures from the second session are left for testing.
Random forgery scores (the case where a forger uses his own signature claiming to be another
user of the system) are obtained by comparing the user model to one signature sample of all the
remaining users. Skilled forgery scores are computed by comparing all of the 20 available skilled
forgeries per user with its own model.
4.2.1 Individual Feature Analysis
The individual discriminative power of the local and global features that are described in Chap-
ter 3 is studied on both scenarios (PDA and pen tablet). The Fisher Discriminant Ratio (FDR)
represents a suitable system-independent measure for this purpose. As a matter of fact, the
FDR is a rather intuitive measure of discriminative power, as it increases with the inter-class
variability and decreases with the intra-class variability. The FDR for the i-th feature of user u
is computed as follows:
FDRi(u) =
(µGi − µFi)2
σ2Gi + σ
2
Fi
where Gi is the set of genuine signatures and Fi represents the set of forgeries. The median
FDR (as the mean value is affected by outliers) over the different users in the development
user set is computed to analyze the discriminative power (in terms of class separability) of each
feature. The median FDR is computed differently for random and skilled forgeries. In the case
of random forgeries, for each user, the FDR between the user samples and the rest of the genuine
signatures in the database is computed while, for skilled forgeries, the FDR is computed between
the genuine signatures of the user and the available skilled forgeries. The FDR has been also
used by Lee et al. (1996) and Lei and Govindaraju (2005) as a measure of feature discriminative
power. 1
The Fisher Discriminant Ratio cannot be directly applied to local features, which are com-
posed by sequences of discrete values (i.e. time functions). As a consequence, another measure
must be found that preferably satisfies the system-independent property and considers the intra-
and inter-class variability, which is a difficult problem. One of the main difficulties is to find a
distance or dissimilarity measure between time-functions. Nalwa (1997) proposes the cross corre-
lation between corresponding signals from two signatures as a similarity measure. However, the
cross correlation is limited to sequences with the same length, so it’s application to signatures
is not straightforward. At this point, Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) arises as a simple and
appropriate elastic distance measure between sequences with different lengths and non-linear
deformations between realizations. By using DTW, we can define the following ratio for the i-th
feature of user u:
1More specifically, the square root of the FDR is used in those works.
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Figure 4.2: Median FDR values and differences between PDA and pen tablet for random (a) and skilled
forgeries (b).
DDRi(u) =
(µDGi − µDFi)2
σ2DGi + σ
2
DFi
where DGi is the set of distances between the i-th feature of the genuine signatures and DFi
is formed by the set of distances between forgeries and the genuine signatures. We call this
measure the Distance Discriminative Ratio (DDR) due to its relation to the FDR. The DDR is
a modified version of the consistency measure for local features proposed by Lei and Govindaraju
(2005).
The EER of the global and local verification systems using each individual feature is also
computed. The correlation between the individual EER and the corresponding FDR or DDR
for each feature is also studied. This allows to verify the relationship between the proposed
distance ratios and the system performance.
4.2.2 Feature Combination Analysis
The analysis of individual features allows to predict which types of features are likely to be
part of an optimal multidimensional feature vector. Nevertheless, the existing relationships or
correlation between them may alter this intuitive reasoning, and features that perform well
individually may not do so in combination with others. Therefore, we perform feature selection
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Figure 4.3: Correlation between the median FDR and the individual EER for each feature for pen tablet
(top) and PDA (bottom).
over the whole set of proposed features to obtain optimal feature subsets for the handheld and
tablet scenario. Feature selection based on the SFFS algorithm is applied separately for random
and skilled forgeries. The contribution of each type of global and local features in the optimum
feature set for each scenario is then studied.
Finally, the verification performance of the optimum feature subset over the validation set
(the remaining 70 users) is studied, and fusion between both systems (local and global) is
performed.
4.3 Development Experimental Results
4.3.1 Global Features
4.3.1.1 Individual Feature Analysis
The median FDR over all the users in the database is depicted in Fig. 4.2 for the four global
feature types, as described in Sect. 3.1.
From Fig. 4.2, we observe that the median FDR for each feature is similar in the pen
tablet and the PDA scenario when random forgeries are considered (top row). The individual
33
4. EXPERIMENTS
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Featurevector size
EE
R
(%
)
Verification results
PDA skilled forgeries
Pen tablet skilled forgeries
PDA random forgeries
Pen tablet random forgeries
Figure 4.4: Verification performance in terms of the size of the optimal feature selected by the SFFS
algorithm.
differences are depicted under each graph for clarification. Negative values indicate that the
FDR is higher for pen tablet than for PDA, while positive values indicate the opposite. As can
be seen, in most cases the FDR is higher for pen tablet, although their difference is usually
small. On the contrary, it is higher for pen tablet than PDA in the case of skilled forgeries
(bottom row).
These results suggest that the verification performance in the PDA scenario against skilled
forgeries would be a priori lower than for pen tablet independently from the classifier used. The
performance should be similar in the case of random forgeries.
The individual performance in terms of the EER is now computed for each feature considering
random and skilled forgeries separately. The correlation between the individual EER and the
median FDR can be observed in Fig. 4.3. As can be seen, the relationship between both
magnitudes is clear (with relatively high values for the correlation coefficient r), proving that
the median FDR is a good estimator for the discriminative power of each feature.
4.3.1.2 Feature Combination Analysis
Feature selection is performed on the development set of 50 users. In Fig. 4.4 the evolution
of the system EER according to the size of the optimum feature vector selected by the SFFS
algorithm is depicted. It can be seen that while the behavior for the case of random forgeries is
similar on both scenarios, the verification performance is significantly better for skilled forgeries
in the pen tablet scenario. If the evolution of the EER is carefully observed, it can be noticed
that both plots for the PDA scenario decrease more steeply until a stable region is reached than
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Figure 4.5: Histogram for each type of feature for skilled (left) and random forgeries (right) on pen
tablet (top) and PDA (bottom)
their equivalent plots in the pen tablet scenario. This indicates that the near optimal feature
vector for PDA requires less features than for pen tablet. Moreover, as the feature vector size
increases, the performance in the PDA case degrades more rapidly than in pen tablet. These two
effects suggest that PDA signatures may carry less information, that is, they can be modeled
with less features and are more affected by the curse of dimensionality when more features are
added.
The contribution of each type of feature in the optimal feature vector is analyzed in Fig. 4.5.
An histogram of each type of feature for different sizes of the optimal feature vector computed
by the SFFS algorithm is depicted for random and skilled forgeries on both scenarios. As can be
seen in Fig. 4.5, Geometry features represent a very high proportion in the PDA scenario, with
a reduced contribution of the rest of features. On the contrary, in the pen tablet scenario, the
contribution of Geometry features is balanced with the one of Time and Speed & Acceleration
features. Few Direction features are present in the optimal feature vectors for random forgeries
and pen tablet. This may be due to the fact that no rotation normalization is performed in our
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Figure 4.6: Median DDR for the extended local feature set considering (a) random and (b) skilled
forgeries. Note that some features are missing for the PDA database, since no pressure or pen inclination
information is captured.
experiments when computing the global features. Rotation may be more controlled in the PDA,
as the user usually holds the PDA in a similar way. On the contrary, users may not always sign
in the pen tablet with a similar orientation as their position may be more variable, depending on
the particular desktop configuration found during acquisition. Speed and Acceleration features
in the PDA may perform worse than for pen tablet due to the effect of sampling errors. Artificial
samples are introduced by interpolation to compensate these errors, which may be affecting the
discriminative power of these features.
4.3.2 Local Features
4.3.2.1 Individual Feature Analysis
To analyze local features, we follow a similar approach to the one for global features. First, the
individual discriminative power based on statistical information is studied by using the Distance
Discriminative Ratio (DDR) defined in Sect. 4.2.1. The DDR is computed separately for each
feature, and differently for random and skilled forgeries. As in the case of global features, for
random forgeries, the DDR is computed using the 5 genuine signatures of each user and one
genuine signature from each of the remaining users. Similarly, for skilled forgeries, the DDR is
computed using the 5 available training signatures and the 20 available corresponding forgeries.
The median values for each feature described in Table 3.1 are depicted in Fig. 4.6. It must be
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Figure 4.7: Local system verification performance in terms of the size of the optimal feature selected by
the SFFS algorithm.
noted that some features are not available in the signatures captured using a PDA, since neither
pressure nor orientation information is available in that scenario.
As can be seen, the median DDR is in general similar on pen tablet and PDA for random
forgeries, while it is higher for pen tablet when skilled forgeries are considered. The obtained
median DDR values are aligned with other related works. For example, Lei and Govindaraju
(2005) concluded that the coordinate sequences (x, y), speed (x˙, y˙, υ) and angle (α, cos(α),
sin(α)) have a high consistency.
4.3.2.2 Feature Combination Analysis
We take an equivalent approach than the one for global features to analyze feature selection with
local features. However, the configuration of the HMM system must be carefully chosen, as a too
complex HMM will heavily penalize low-dimensional feature vectors and a too simple one may
lead to non representative results. We opt for the original configuration described in (Fierrez
et al., 2007), with 2 states and 32 Gaussian Mixtures per state.
Feature selection using the SFFS algorithm is performed over the 21 (PDA) and 27 (pen
tablet) feature sets presented in Table 3.2 separately for random and skilled forgeries. As
for global features, feature selection is performed on the development set of 50 users. The
verification performance in terms of the EER for all the possible values of the optimal feature
vector dimensionality is depicted in Fig. 4.7. As can be seen, a better performance is in general
achieved in the pen tablet scenario.
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Table 4.1: Selected optimal feature vectors by the SFFS algorithm on the development set.
Scenario Best performing features
PDA skilled forgeries x, y, υ, ρ, y˙, ρ˙, c
PDA random forgeries x, y, ρ, x˙, y˙, θ˙, α˙, c
Pen tablet skilled forgeries x, y, υ, y˙, θ˙, υ˙, υr, α˙, c
Pen tablet random forgeries x, υ, y˙, θ˙, α˙, c
Table 4.2: System performance on the validation set using global or local features on both scenarios.
Vectors of 40 features have been selected in every configuration for the global system.
Optimization scenario
Global Local
EERrd(%) EERsk(%) EERrd(%) EERsk(%)
PDA, skilled forgeries 7.23 16.29 6.03 17.48
PDA, random forgeries 5.43 17.72 5.79 22.24
Pen tablet, skilled forgeries 5.61 11.31 5.42 11.10
Pen tablet, random forgeries 6.69 12.98 5.74 13.80
As with global features, it can be also noted that the verification performance increases and
degrades more rapidly in the PDA scenario as more features are added. It could be hypothesized
that this is due to the fact that less features are considered for PDA, as neither pressure nor pen
orientation information is available. However, it was found in the experiments that none of the
features related to these magnitudes were selected by the SFFS algorithm in the best performing
feature vector sizes. So, at least, it can be stated that less features are required in the PDA
scenario to achieve the optimum performance. This corroborates the hypothesis introduced in
Sect. 4.3.1, stating that signatures captured with the PDA carry less information.
The optimal feature combinations selected by the SFFS algorithm are presented in Table 4.1.
Several remarks can be extracted from these results. First, neither pressure nor pen orientation-
related features are present in the optimal feature vectors, suggesting that the lack of them
should not penalize the verification performance. It can also be seen that no second derivative-
related features are present in the optimal sets. Three features are present in all vectors, namely
the x coordinate, the first derivative of the y coordinate and the cosine c of the trajectory angle
α. Only 13 of the 27 proposed features are present in any of the optimal feature vectors.
These results reveal that less features are needed for HMM-based signature verification com-
pared to the ones commonly considered in other works such as (Fierrez et al., 2007; Richiardi
et al., 2005; Van et al., 2007), at least under these experimental conditions. Contrary to the
results presented by Muramatsu and Matsumoto (2007), pressure or pen-orientation features
prove to be less discriminative than the rest of features (at least when they are combined with
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Figure 4.8: System verification performance on the development set using score fusion for different
values of the fusion weighting coefficient k.
other types of features). The absence of pressure in the optimal feature vectors suggests that a
pen tablet-based system does not have a priori advantage over a PDA system due to the capture
of pressure information. It is also worth noting that most the best performing features selected
by the algorithm are simple in terms of their computation, like the raw coordinate sequences,
speed and angle-related features. Pen inclination-related features, which are not available in
the PDA, are not part of the optimal feature vectors for pen tablet. In our experiments, it is
observed that some of them are present in near-optimal vectors (i.e. optimal feature vectors with
a dimensionality that is close to the optimal one), especially the ones related to pen-azimuth.
4.4 Validation Experimental Results
Until now, the verification performance of the selected feature subsets has been computed using
the development set of 50 users. These results may be consequently affected by overfitting to
the development data. To validate our results, we compute the verification performance on the
test set of 70 users on the database selecting the best performing feature combinations on the
development set for global and local features. Results are given in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.9: DET plots for the (a) PDA and (b) Pen tablet scenario using score fusion and feature
vectors optimized against skilled forgeries.
Table 4.3: System performance on the validation set of 70 users using score fusion.
Optimization Scenario EERrd(%) EERsk(%)
PDA, skilled forgeries 4.70 12.29
Pen tablet, skilled forgeries 5.65 7.80
4.5 Fusion of Global and Local Systems
Fusion Development Experiments
Fusion of the global and local systems with optimal feature vectors is performed via weighted
sum of the match scores (Ross et al., 2006). Only the systems optimized for skilled forgeries
on both scenarios are considered, as they provide a reasonable performance against random
forgeries. The fusion score sf is obtained as
sf = sg + k · sl
where sg and sl are the match scores of the global and local systems respectively. The fusion
weighting coefficient k is heuristically set by observing the system performance in terms of the
EER on the development signature set. The system EER for different values of k on both
scenarios is shown in Fig. 4.8. As can be seen, the results are considerably better for skilled
forgeries in the pen tablet scenario than for PDA, primarily due to the better performance of
the global and local systems against skilled forgeries using pen tablet.
An optimal value of k = 1 is chosen for the pen tablet scenario. The most appropriate
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value of k is less clearer for the PDA scenario, as it is notably different for random and skilled
forgeries. As our aim is to optimize against skilled forgeries, we set a value of k = 1.5 for PDA.
The higher optimal value for k in the PDA scenario and skilled forgeries indicates that the local
system is in this case more discriminative than the global one. On the contrary, an optimal
value of k below 1 for random forgeries indicates that the global system performs better than
the local one in the PDA scenario.
Fusion Validation Results
The system performance using score fusion on the validation set of 70 users is finally computed by
using the heuristically selected weighing coefficient k on each scenario. The system performance
is represented by DET plots in Fig. 4.9. The EER is also shown in Table 4.3. As can be
observed, the verification performance is similar on both scenarios when random forgeries are
considered. On the contrary, the performance is much better for pen tablet in the case of skilled
forgeries, even though both systems have been tuned specifically against skilled forgeries via
feature selection.
A notable increase in the performance can be observed when score fusion is applied with
respect to the individual local and global systems, especially for the case of skilled forgeries.
4.6 Discussion: Pen-up trajectories
It is observed from the results that in general the discriminative power of dynamic features
against skilled forgeries is lower in the PDA scenario compared to the common pen tablet acqui-
sition. On the other hand, the results are similar in both scenarios when random forgeries are
considered. The individual feature class separability measures indicate a slightly higher discrim-
inative power for pen tablet and random forgeries, although the final verification performance
is even better for PDA when considering random forgeries in some cases.
As has been previously stated, the observed differences in the performance and class separa-
bility measures may be due to the increased variability and sampling errors in the PDA scenario.
Another key issue that must be taken into account is the inability of the PDA to capture signals
during pen-ups. In the pen-tablet signature database used for the experiments, it is obtained
that among genuine signatures an average of 18% of the captured signature signals correspond
to pen-ups. The histogram of the proportion of number of pen-up samples compared to the
total signature samples is presented in Fig. 4.10.
The lack of pen movement information during pen-ups may negatively affect the verification
performance. In order to test this hypothesis, the signatures from the pen-tablet database are
modified by eliminating the samples corresponding to pen-ups (i.e. with zero pressure). Pen-
ups are interpolated using splines, following the same procedure than with the PDA dataset
signatures. A new database of pen-tablet signatures from the original 120 users with interpolated
pen-ups is obtained. This dataset is divided in a development set of 50 users and a validation
set of 70 users, as in the previous experiments.
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Figure 4.10: Histogram of the proportion of pen-up samples compared to the total number of the captured
signature samples in the pen tablet scenario.
Feature selection both for global and local features is performed on the development set of
50 users. The verification performance for each possible size of the optimal feature vector for
local and global features is presented in Fig. 4.11. As can be seen, the verification performance
against skilled forgeries is negatively affected only in the local verification system by the lack of
pen-up trajectory information. The performance is not affected in the global system. Against
random forgeries, the EER remains unaffected by the lack of pen-up information.
The robustness of the global system against the lack of pen-up information may be due to
the holistic nature of the extracted features. The average 18% of samples that are interpolated
are not significatively affecting the feature values, or at least the relationship among the feature
values from different signatures. On the other hand, the HMM-based local system is highly
affected by the lack of pen-up information when skilled forgeries are considered.
These results suggest that even though pen-ups are interpolated in the PDA scenario, the
verification performance is similar than in the pen tablet scenario. In the case of skilled forgeries,
the error rate is much higher in the PDA scenario in part, but not only, due to the lack of pen-up
trajectory information.
4.7 BioSecure Multimodal Evaluation Campaign - Mobile Sce-
nario
The BioSecure Multimodal Evaluation Campaign (BMEC) was held in 2007 with the aim of
comparing the performance of verification systems from different research groups on individual
biometric modalities and fusion scenarios (Alonso-Fernandez et al., 2008). In particular, the
Mobile Scenario consisted on 4 modalities and fusion, using a subset of the BioSecure Multimodal
Database captured on mobile conditions (i.e. using portable devices such as a PDA).
In this section we describe the systems presented to the Signature Verification modality of
BMEC 2007 - Mobile Scenario and compare them to our system. In this evaluation, a signature
subset from the BioSecure database was used, although it is not the same set than the one used
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Figure 4.11: Verification performance of the (a) global and (b) local systems in terms of the size of the
optimal feature set selected by the SFFS algorithm.
in this work. This is due to privacy issues, as the BioSecure Database has not been released
yet. Nevertheless, the protocol followed in this work is equivalent, as 50 users were issued for
development purposes and the evaluation was carried on an larger independent dataset (of ca.
400 subjects). As in this work, user models were computed from 5 genuine signatures.
A total of 11 systems from 6 institutions were presented. For the sake of clarity, we will refer
to these systems using the same nomenclature as in the evaluation report (GET-INT, 2007).
We provide a high level description of each system:
• AMSL: this system is based on the Levenshtein or edit distance algorithm (Schimke et al.,
2004). The signature is modeled as an event string, derived from the pen motion like pen-
ups and the maxima and minima from position and speed. The edit distance is used to
match strings extracted from the signatures.
• EPFL1 and EPFL2: these systems use Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) and local
features. They differ on the pre-processing steps and the number of Gaussian components
(24 and 36 respectively). Scores are normalized by a world model with four Gaussian
components.
• EPFL3 and EPFL4: these two systems are GMM multi-classifiers (7 and 6 classifiers
respectively). They are composed of five GMMs using local features and two and one
using global features respectively. Both systems implement a world model as EPFL1 and
EPFL2 to compute the final match score. EPFL4 extracts six quality measures from the
signatures. This measures are fused with the match scores to produce a binary output
(accept or reject). The four EPFL systems are modified versions of those introduced
in (Richiardi et al., 2005).
43
4. EXPERIMENTS
Table 4.4: Signature verification results of the BioSecure Multimodal Evaluation Campaign - Mobile
Scenario. Results are given in terms of EER for random (rd) an skilled (sk) forgeries. The best results
obtained in the present thesis following a similar experimental protocol (on a different set of signatures)
are included for reference (in bold).
System EERrd(%) EERsk(%)
AMSL 8.03 24.31
EPFL1 6.14 18.03
EPFL2 5.12 17.71
EPFL3 4.03 13.58
EPFL4 11.24 17.48
GET-INT 8.07 13.43
UNIFRI1 4.16 14.14
UNIFRI2 5.61 16.09
UPM1 5.18 30.39
UPM2 6.58 21.45
UniTOURS 13.14 29.14
Ref. System 4.88 15.36
Our approach: local +
global. Optimized for
PDA & skilled forg-
eries
4.70 12.29
• Reference System and GET-INT: a 19- and a 21-dimensional local feature vector is
extracted at each point respectively to train an HMM. Information from the likelihood and
the Viterbi path are fused to compute the match score, as described in (Van et al., 2007).
The GET-INT system performs interpolation of missing samples and user-dependent score
normalization.
• UNIFRI1: an HMM is trained with 19 local features extracted at each sample of the
signatures. A world model computed on the development dataset of 50 users is used for
score normalization. This system is derived from the one presented in (Humm et al., 2007).
• UNIFRI2: this system is based on a GMM with the same features as UNIFRI1. For
each user, the GMM is adapted from a Universal Background Model (UBM) with the
Maximum a Posteriori algorithm. The UBM is further employed as a world model for
score normalization.
• UPM1 and UPM2: both are global systems relying on features selected from the 100-
feature set described in Chapt. 3 by the SFFS algorithm. The Mahalanobis distance is
used to compute the match score between a test signature and the user model. These
systems are based on the one described in (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005a).
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• UniTOURS: this system segments signatures at local speed minima. Three variations of
the DTW algorithm are then applied to calculate the similarity between signatures. The
final score is computed as the minimum score given by the 5 reference signatures.
As can be seen, the majority of systems rely on local features and HMMs or GMMs, although
the best performing system in SVC 2004 was based on DTW (Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2005).
The results for each system obtained in the BioSecure competition are presented in Table 4.4,
together with the best results obtained in this thesis (in bold). It is worth noting that the global
systems (UPM1 and UPM2) present a competitive performance for random forgeries, although
they are outperformed by other systems in the case of skilled forgeries. This may be due to
overfitting of the SFFS algorithm to the set of skilled forgeries supplied in the development
dataset. The relatively high EER for all systems, especially against skilled forgeries, suggests
that the Mobile Scenario signature corpus of the BioSecure Multimodal Database is a very
challenging dataset. This may be primarily due to the worst case scenario approach followed for
obtaining the skilled forgeries and the existing sampling errors.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
The problem of automatic signature verification on handheld devices has been analyzed in
this thesis. Signature verification as a biometric trait has been studied, and its applications on
handheld devices and challenges have been outlined. The state of the art of dynamic signature
verification has been summarized, focusing on feature- and function-based systems. The most
recent and popular public signature databases have been described, focusing on the BioSecure
Multimodal Database, which includes signatures captured on a PDA.
An analysis of the specificities of signature verification on handheld devices vs. the traditional
pen tablet scenario has been performed. The comparison has been done using the BioSecure
Multimodal Database which contains signatures from the same set of individuals captured with
a PDA and a pen tablet, allowing a fair comparison between both scenarios. A global and a local
system are considered. The global system considers the 100-feature set proposed in (Fierrez-
Aguilar et al., 2005a). The local system is based on the one described in (Fierrez et al., 2007),
to which the proposed feature set is extended with other features from the literature.
The analysis is carried out following two perspectives. First, a statistical point of view,
by using statistical class separability measures of individual features. Second, an applied per-
spective, by optimizing the system EER via feature selection. The impact of interpolating the
pen-up trajectory samples in the pen tablet scenario (imitating the PDA scenario) has also been
evaluated. As a result, it is shown that for the global system, the verification performance is
not affected when the pen-up trajectory is interpolated. On the other hand, the performance of
the local system is negatively affected, especially against skilled forgeries.
Finally, fusion of the optimal systems against skilled forgeries (in terms of the feature selec-
tion algorithm) is performed, and the verification performance is compared to the one obtained
by other systems in the recent BioSecure Multimodal Evaluation Campaign - Mobile Scenario
(BMEC), with promising results. In this evaluation, several signature verification systems were
compared using an equivalent protocol compared to the one used in this thesis.
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5.1 Conclusions
The individual feature discriminative power as well as the verification performance of the systems
considered is similar against random forgeries on both scenarios (PDA and pen tablet). In the
PDA scenario, it is observed that when using feature selection, geometrical features are the
majority in the optimal feature vector. This may be due to the sampling errors, which may
affect the computation of features related to speed or orientation. The inability to capture the
pen trajectory during pen-ups (which must be interpolated) by handheld devices is also affecting
the verification performance, as less user-specific information is contained on the signatures.
When performing feature selection, the better relative performance of low-dimensional optimal
feature vectors compared to higher dimensional ones in the pen-tablet scenario suggests that
signatures captured with the PDA carry less information compared to signatures captured with
a pen tablet.
The discriminative power of the features against skilled forgeries is much higher on the pen
tablet scenario. It has been observed that, for the local system, this difference is partly due
to the lack of the pen trajectory information during pen-ups on the PDA, which represents in
average the 18% of the total signature signal length. Another key factor in the performance
variation may be the acquisition protocol for skilled forgeries on both scenarios. In the PDA
scenario, forgers had on-screen access to the original strokes. This may have led to a better
quality of forgeries in the PDA signature subcorpus. This hypothesis is corroborated by the
similar verification performance against random forgeries on both scenarios for both systems.
Moreover, the verification performance of the fusion system against random forgeries is even
better for PDA than for pen tablet.
The applied feature selection algorithm has shown that less features than the traditionally
considered when using HMMs for signature verification are necessary to achieve an optimal
verification performance. It is worth noting the promising performance achieved by the global
system, contrary to the intuitive idea that local systems are usually more reliable. This had al-
ready been observed in the results of the BioSecure Multimodal Evaluation Campaign (BMEC),
where the results against random forgeries of the proposed global system were ranked among
the best performing systems.
Fusion of the local and global systems improves the system EER in ca. 25% both for random
and skilled forgeries. Score normalization techniques, like the ones proposed by the participants
in BMEC may further improve the verification performance.
5.2 Future Work
Considering the results obtained in this work, a number of potential research lines arise. Among
these, we cite the following:
• The analysis of signature verification on handheld devices using a classifier based on Dy-
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namic Time Warping. This type of classifiers has reached a notable performance for sig-
nature verification (Kholmatov and Yanikoglu, 2005) with pen tablet signature databases.
In most implementations in the literature, no pressure information has been used in DTW-
based systems.
• The usage of quality measures (Richiardi et al., 2007) to analyze the impact of the signature
acquisition on mobile conditions. These measures may also be useful to perform quality-
based fusion (Fierrez-Aguilar et al., 2005c).
• The study of sensor interoperability (Alonso-Fernandez et al., 2005) on signature verifi-
cation. The signatures from the BioSecure Multimodal Database can be used to assess
the feasibility of sensor interoparability between the handheld and pen tablet scenarios.
This is also known as channel mismatch, which is a topic of big interest in the speaker
recognition community (Ramos et al., 2008).
• The proliferation of touch- and multitouch-screens in handheld devices is becoming focused
in applications where no PDA stylus is required and users interface with applications using
their fingertips. In this context, new possibilities such as graphical passwords (Jermyn
et al., 1999) or even signatures traced with the fingertips can be explored.
• Template selection and update techniques have proven to be effective for other biometric
traits, such as fingerprints (Uludag et al., 2004), but have not been yet studied for sig-
nature verification. Such techniques may alleviate the problem of short- and long-term
variability in signature verification and the scarcity of training samples, improving the
system performance in the challenging scenario of handheld devices.
• Signatures are sensitive data due to their legal implications. Consequently, user templates
and captured signature data must be secured. Several techniques have been proposed in
the literature to securely store biometric data (Jain et al., 2008), among which some refer
specifically to signatures Freire et al. (2008).
• The intrinsic information from signatures, and the differences in the information that is
carried in the signatures captured in the scenarios considered in this thesis (PDA and pen
tablet) can be studied from an Information Theory perspective. This can help to predict
the relative verification performance that can be expected among the different scenarios.
Some work has already been carried out on this subject (Garcia-Salicetti et al.).
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Appendix A
Part of the work of this thesis will be presented in the 9th International Conference in Pattern
Recognition, ICPR 2008. The accepted paper is appended.
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Abstract
The proliferation of handheld devices such as PDAs
and smartphones represents a new scenario for auto-
matic signature veriﬁcation. Traditionally, research on
signature veriﬁcation has been carried out employing
signatures acquired using digitizing tablets or Tablet-
PCs. In this paper we study the effects of the mobile ac-
quisition conditions and we analyze the considerations
that must be taken in the new handheld scenario. A sig-
nature veriﬁcation system adapted to handheld devices
via feature selection is proposed and a systematic com-
parison with a traditional pen tablet-based system is
performed. The system is combined with another based
on Hidden Markov Models using score fusion. Results
conﬁrm an increased signature variability in the case of
handheld devices.1
1. Introduction
Despite its widespread social and legal acceptance,
signature veriﬁcation is still a challenging task within
biometrics [1, 2]. As a behavioral biometric trait, sig-
natures are subject to a considerable variability even
on successive realizations, which can be increased over
medium or large periods of time. Moreover, the possi-
bility of creating forgeries with a relative ease, exposes
a signature veriﬁcation system to challenges not com-
monly present among other biometrics. Consequently, a
signature veriﬁcation system designer must face a high
intra-class variability (between the signatures of a spe-
ciﬁc user) and a low inter-class variability, when forg-
eries are considered.
1This work has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Edu-
cation under project TEC2006-13141-C03-03. J. Fierrez is supported
by a Marie Curie Fellowship from the European Commission. J. Gal-
bally is supported by a FPU fellowship from the Spanish MEC.
Two main types of dynamic signature veriﬁcation
systems exist. Feature-based systems model the sig-
nature as a holistic multidimensional vector composed
of global features [3]. Function-based systems extract
time functions from the signature signal (pen coordi-
nates, pressure, etc.) and perform signature match-
ing via elastic or statistical techniques like Dynamic
Time Warping (DTW) [4] or Hidden Markov Models
(HMM) [5]. The typical architecture of an automatic
signature veriﬁcation system is depicted in Fig. 1.
Recently, smartphones and handheld devices have
gathered a high level of popularity in the context of
convergence and ubiquitous access to information and
services. These devices represent a clear target for the
deployment of a signature veriﬁcation system, provid-
ing enough processing power and a stylus-based input.
Signature veriﬁcation can be used as a convenient alter-
native to passwords that may be forgotten or stolen for
applications like e-commerce or access control. Nev-
ertheless, signature veriﬁcation on handheld devices is
affected by factors not present in other input devices
primarily due to a small input area, poor ergonomics or
the fact that the user may be in movement. As a conse-
quence, the signing process may be degraded.
Interestingly, the recent BioSecureMultimodal Eval-
uation Campaign (BMEC) [6], with the participation of
independent research institutions, has shown that veriﬁ-
cation results for the case of handheld devices is signif-
icantly lower than those with other databases captured
using a pen tablet [7].
In this paper, the problem of signature veriﬁcation on
handheld devices is studied. An analysis of the discrim-
inant power of different types of features (temporal, ge-
ometric, etc.) is performed using the Fisher Discrimi-
nant Ratio (FDR) and feature selection algorithms. The
resulting feature-based system, adapted to the handheld
scenario, is further combined with an HMM system us-
ing score fusion, and the overall performance is mea-
sured against other sate-of-the-art systems using the re-
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Figure 1. Signature Veriﬁcation System Architecture.
sults of BMEC. The signatures used for experiments
were captured both on a PDA and a digitizing tablet and
correspond to the same users in both scenarios, allowing
a fair comparison between them.
2. Related Work
Feature-based dynamic signature veriﬁcation has
been extensively studied [3, 8, 9]. Despite the large
amount of different global feature sets that have been
proposed (a maximum of 100 features are considered
in [9]), the usually low amount of available training
data motivates the use of feature selection to reduce the
feature vector size (due to the curse of dimensionality).
Several feature selection techniques have been proposed
in the literature, being the Sequential Forward Feature
Selection (SFFS) one of the best performing methods
reported [10]. Nevertheless, to the extent of our knowl-
edge, all the previous works on feature selection for dy-
namic signature veriﬁcation have used data from digi-
tizing tablets, so their observations may not fully apply
to the case of handheld devices.
Function-based signature veriﬁcation using DTW [4]
or HMMs [5] is the most popular approach in signature
veriﬁcation. In these systems, the captured time func-
tions are used to model each user signature. It must
be taken into account that PDAs and other handheld de-
vices are able to capture only pen position signals, while
pen tablets provide additional signals such as pressure
and pen inclination angles. An analysis of the implica-
tions of the lack of these signals in the PDA scenario is
out of the scope of this work.
Finally, fusion of the feature- and function-based ap-
proaches has been reported to provide a better perfor-
mance than the individual systems [9].
3. Signature Features
The set of features used in this work is the one pre-
sented in [9], which comprises 100 features. This is
an extensive set that includes a considerable amount of
features previously presented in the literature. These
can be divided in four categories corresponding to the
following magnitudes (the numbering is the same used
in [9]):
• Time (25 features), related to signature duration,
or timing of events such as pen-ups or local max-
ima: 1, 13, 22, 32, 38, 40-42, 50, 52, 58-60, 62,
64, 68, 79, 81-82, 87-90, 94, 100.
• Speed and Acceleration (25 features), from the
ﬁrst and second order time derivatives of the po-
sition time functions, like average speed or maxi-
mum speed: 4-6, 9-11, 14, 23, 26, 29, 31, 33, 39,
44-45, 48, 69, 74, 76, 80, 83, 85, 91-92, 96.
• Direction (18 features), extracted from the path
trajectory like the starting direction or mean direc-
tion between pen-ups: 34, 51, 56-57, 61, 63, 66,
71-73, 77-78, 84, 93, 95, 97-99.
• Geometry (32 features), associated to the strokes
or signature aspect-ratio: 2, 3, 7-8, 12, 15-21, 24-
25, 27-28, 30, 35-37, 43, 46-47, 49, 53-55, 65, 67,
70, 75, 86.
Feature selection on this 100-feature set is performed
using the SFFS algorithm [10], which is set to minimize
the system EER using a classiﬁer based on the Maha-
lanobis distance.
4. Experimental Setup
A subset of the PDA and pen tablet signature cor-
pus of the BioSecure multimodal biometric database [6]
is used for experiments. It consists of 120 users, with
20 genuine signatures and 20 skilled forgeries per user
and acquisition device (PDA and pen tablet). The gen-
uine signatures were acquired in two different sessions
separated by an average period of two months, being 5
signatures from the ﬁrst session and the remaining 15
from the second session. In each session, signatures
were produced by the user in blocks of 5, leaving a gap
of some minutes between each block. Signatures were
captured with a PDA while the user was standing and
holding the PDA with one hand in the handheld sce-
nario, whereas for the pen tablet case, they were cap-
tured while the user was sitting, using a pen on a paper
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Figure 2. Left: signatures from a user of the database on both scenarios and their correspond-
ing signals used for the experiments. No pressure signals are available for the signatures
captured with PDA. Right: distribution of two example features for a particular user.
placed over the tablet. This emulates real operating con-
ditions.
Only the x and y position signals and the sample
timestamps are captured by the PDA, while pressure
information and pen orientation is also provided by
the pen tablet. Skilled forgeries for each user were
performed by 4 different users (5 forgeries each) in a
“worst case” scenario: each forger had visual access to
the dynamics of the genuine signature and a tracker tool
allowing to see the original strokes in both scenarios.
An example of the captured signatures, their associated
signals and the distribution of two features on both sce-
narios is shown in Fig. 2. It can be seen that signa-
tures captured with the PDA have missing samples due
to capture errors.
From each subset, the signatures from 50 users are
used for development purposes, while the remaining 70
will be used to compute the veriﬁcation performance.
The 5 signatures from the ﬁrst session are used to com-
pute the user models. This setup follows the protocol
of the BIOSECURE Multimodal Evaluation Campaign
(BMEC), where a subset of 50 users was previously
released for algorithm tuning before submission to the
competition, which was performed by the evaluation or-
ganizers on sequestered test data. For the PDA subset,
a preprocessing step is performed to interpolate missing
samples.
Random forgery scores (the case where a forger uses
his own signature claiming to be another user of the
system) are obtained by comparing the user model to
one signature sample of all the remaining users. Skilled
forgery scores are computed by comparing all of the 20
available skilled forgeries per user with its own model.
The experiments are structured as follows: ﬁrst, an
analysis based on Fisher Discriminant Ratio (FDR) for
each individual feature is performed over the develop-
ment set. Next, feature selection based on the SFFS al-
gorithm is performed (separately for random and skilled
forgeries) to obtain an optimum feature subset for the
handheld and tablet scenario. The contribution of each
type of features (Time, Speed, etc.) in the optimum fea-
ture set for each scenario is then studied. Finally, the
veriﬁcation performance of the optimum feature subset
over the test set (the remaining 70 users) is studied, and
fusion with an HMM-based system is performed.
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Figure 3. Median FDR over the development set for random (top) and skilled forgeries (bottom).
Right: EER vs. number of features selected by the SFFS algorithm on the development set.
5. Results
To analyze the discriminative power embedded in the
different feature types, the Fisher Discriminant Ratio
is used as in [8], but computed for individual features
and individual subjects. The median FDR (as the mean
value is affected by outliers) over the different users in
the development user set is depicted in Fig. 3 for the
four feature types speciﬁed in Sect. 3. The FDR pro-
vides an intuitive measure of discriminative power, as it
increases with the inter-class variability and decreases
with the intra-class variability. The median FDR is
computed differently for random and skilled forgeries.
In the case of random forgeries, for each user, the FDR
between the user samples and the rest of the genuine
signatures in the database is computed, while for skilled
forgeries, the FDR is computed between the genuine
signatures of the user and the available skilled forgeries.
From Fig. 3, we observe that the median FDR for
each feature is similar in the pen tablet and the PDA sce-
nario when random forgeries are considered (top row).
On the contrary, it is higher for pen tablet than PDA in
the case of skilled forgeries (bottom row). This suggests
that the veriﬁcation performance in the PDA scenario
against skilled forgeries would be a priori lower than
for pen tablet independently from the classiﬁer used. In
Fig. 2, the distribution of the normalized values of two
example features is depicted.
In Fig. 3 (right) the evolution of the system EER ac-
cording to the size of the optimum feature vector se-
lected by the SFFS algorithm is depicted. It can be ob-
served that while the behavior for the case of random
forgeries is similar on both scenarios, the veriﬁcation
performance is signiﬁcantly better for skilled forgeries
in the pen-tablet scenario.
The contribution of each type of feature is analyzed
in Fig. 4. An histogram of each type of feature for dif-
ferent sizes of the optimal feature vector computed by
the SFFS algorithm is depicted for random and skilled
forgeries on both scenarios. As can be seen in Fig. 4(a)
and (b), Geometry features represent a very high pro-
portion in the PDA scenario, with a much reduced con-
tribution of the rest of features. On the contrary, in the
pen tablet scenario (Fig. 4(c) and (d)), the contribution
of Geometry features is balanced with the one of Time
and Speed and Acceleration features.
These results reveal that for the PDA scenario, the
discriminative power of dynamic features such as Speed
and Acceleration and Time features may be much lower
than geometrical features. Thus, for the case of skilled
forgeries, the veriﬁcation performance is degraded on
the PDA scenario, as Geometry features are commonly
the easiest to forge.
Fusion of the PDA global feature system optimized
for skilled forgeries with an user-dependent HMM sys-
tem is performed via weighed sum of the match scores.
The fusion weights have been heuristically adjusted to
optimize both the random and skilled EERs. An opti-
mum vector size of 50 features is selected. In the HMM
system, the number of states is proportional to the mean
length of the user training signatures, and the number
of Gaussian Mixtures in the observations is set to max-
imize the likelihood of the training data with a limit of
32 mixtures. This HMM system is based on the one
presented in [5]. The veriﬁcation results are shown in
the ﬁrst row of Table 1 for the test set (70 users).
5.1. BioSecure Evaluation
The BioSecure Multimodal Evaluation Cam-
paign [6] was held in 2007 and was composed of
an Access Control Scenario and a Mobile Scenario.
A signature veriﬁcation modality was present in the
Mobile Scenario, where signatures from the BioSecure
multimodal database were used for the evaluation. A
total of 11 systems were presented, from 6 independent
research groups. The evaluation protocol is equiva-
lent to the one followed in this paper (with another
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Figure 4. Histograms of feature types for different optimum feature-vector sizes and scenarios.
Table 1. PDA scenario EER comparison
for random (rd) and skilled (sk) forgeries.
System EERrd EERsk
Proposed system (HMM+features) 4.0% 11.9%
BMEC best for sk. forgeries [11] 8.07% 13.43%
BMEC best for rd. forgeries [8] 4.03% 13.58%
data subset, captured in the same conditions). The
best results of the evaluated systems for random and
skilled forgeries are shown in Table 1, as well as the
performance of the system proposed in this work. The
winner system against skilled forgeries was based on
an ensemble of local and global Gaussian Mixture
Models and derived from [8]. The best system for
random forgeries was HMM-based, using fusion of the
likelihood and Viterbi path scores [11]. As can be seen,
a notable veriﬁcation performance has been obtained in
the present work compared to those systems.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
The importance of adapting the traditional tablet-
based signature veriﬁcation systems to the new PDA
scenario has been stated. The observed low discrimina-
tive power of dynamic features (time, speed and accel-
eration) in the PDA scenario suggests that ergonomics
and an unfamiliar surface and signing device (touch-
screen and PDA stylus vs. traditional pen and paper)
may be affecting the signature process. On the other
hand, the users are still able to reproduce the geome-
try of their own signature, which is shown by the higher
consistency of geometric features. Futurework includes
the application of techniques aimed to compensate the
increased variability found in the handheld scenario,
like feature subset transformations based on session-
invariant subspaces, recently introduced with signiﬁ-
cant success in the speaker recognition literature [12].
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